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Introduction
Introduction
Motivation for the paper
Main question: how can universities’ strategic behavior affect the provision of
higher education and at what price?
Universities are confronted with a new environment characterized by:
the harmonization of higher education systems with the Bologna process
(more specifically in undergraduate studies),
increased student mobility,
a greater autonomy granted to universities.
These changes are likely to get universities to engage in competition on the
enrollment market.
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Research issues
Issue 1: how does competition between universities affect:
the size of universities (capacity),
the choice of the number of students enrolled and/or the level of fees?
Issue 2: how does the number of universities impact social welfare: is it
better to have many small universities or a few large universities?
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Observation: two different university systems
Anglo-Saxon system: universities can set their own fees (as in the UK, the
USA, and Canada, among others).
European system: universities cannot use a variable pricing strategy as a
response to their new environment (as in France, Spain, Italy, and Germany).
Tuition fees are set by public authorities, without control over the number of
students enrolled.
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Stylized facts
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1 a greater (smaller) number of small (large) universities in Anglo-Saxon
countries than in old European countries,
2 higher tuition fees in Anglo-Saxon countries compared with European
countries,
3 Anglo-Saxons countries have a much higher proportion of students enrolling
in higher education compared with old European countries,
4 the average number of students per university is lower in the Anglo-Saxon
system.
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Another stylized fact:
In the UK: following the reform (2012), fees have more than tripled. Over this
period, no improvement in teaching has been noted.
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How can disparities in tuition fees between countries be explained?
How can the high level of tuition fees following their liberalization in some
countries be explained?
Is it preferable to have many small universities or a few large ones?
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Preview of the model
Two competition strategies:
1 Bertrand competition: universities compete in terms of price: they set their
own fees (as in the UK, the USA, Canada, and Australia)
2 Cournot competition: universities compete in terms of quantity: they decide
on the number of students enrolled (as in France, Italy, and Germany, among
others)
The fact that universities pursue both teaching and research objectives
affects how they compete for students:
Students are at once inputs and clients of the educational process (Rotchschild
and White, 1995)
Research requires money; more students enrolled may imply an increased
research budget. However, increasing the size of the student population may
be costly.
M-L. Cabon-Dhersin & J. Didisse How Do Universities Compete for Students? EconomiX, Univ. Paris X, 7 April 2016 9 / 28
Introduction
Introduction
Preview of the model
Two competition strategies:
1 Bertrand competition: universities compete in terms of price: they set their
own fees (as in the UK, the USA, Canada, and Australia)
2 Cournot competition: universities compete in terms of quantity: they decide
on the number of students enrolled (as in France, Italy, and Germany, among
others)
The fact that universities pursue both teaching and research objectives
affects how they compete for students:
Students are at once inputs and clients of the educational process (Rotchschild
and White, 1995)
Research requires money; more students enrolled may imply an increased
research budget. However, increasing the size of the student population may
be costly.
M-L. Cabon-Dhersin & J. Didisse How Do Universities Compete for Students? EconomiX, Univ. Paris X, 7 April 2016 9 / 28
Introduction
Introduction
Preview of the model
Two competition strategies:
1 Bertrand competition: universities compete in terms of price: they set their
own fees (as in the UK, the USA, Canada, and Australia)
2 Cournot competition: universities compete in terms of quantity: they decide
on the number of students enrolled (as in France, Italy, and Germany, among
others)
The fact that universities pursue both teaching and research objectives
affects how they compete for students:
Students are at once inputs and clients of the educational process (Rotchschild
and White, 1995)
Research requires money; more students enrolled may imply an increased
research budget. However, increasing the size of the student population may
be costly.
M-L. Cabon-Dhersin & J. Didisse How Do Universities Compete for Students? EconomiX, Univ. Paris X, 7 April 2016 9 / 28
Introduction
Introduction
Preview of the model
Two competition strategies:
1 Bertrand competition: universities compete in terms of price: they set their
own fees (as in the UK, the USA, Canada, and Australia)
2 Cournot competition: universities compete in terms of quantity: they decide
on the number of students enrolled (as in France, Italy, and Germany, among
others)
The fact that universities pursue both teaching and research objectives
affects how they compete for students:
Students are at once inputs and clients of the educational process (Rotchschild
and White, 1995)
Research requires money; more students enrolled may imply an increased
research budget. However, increasing the size of the student population may
be costly.
M-L. Cabon-Dhersin & J. Didisse How Do Universities Compete for Students? EconomiX, Univ. Paris X, 7 April 2016 9 / 28
Introduction
Introduction
Preview of the model
Two competition strategies:
1 Bertrand competition: universities compete in terms of price: they set their
own fees (as in the UK, the USA, Canada, and Australia)
2 Cournot competition: universities compete in terms of quantity: they decide
on the number of students enrolled (as in France, Italy, and Germany, among
others)
The fact that universities pursue both teaching and research objectives
affects how they compete for students:
Students are at once inputs and clients of the educational process (Rotchschild
and White, 1995)
Research requires money; more students enrolled may imply an increased
research budget. However, increasing the size of the student population may
be costly.
M-L. Cabon-Dhersin & J. Didisse How Do Universities Compete for Students? EconomiX, Univ. Paris X, 7 April 2016 9 / 28
Introduction
Introduction
Preview of the model
Two competition strategies:
1 Bertrand competition: universities compete in terms of price: they set their
own fees (as in the UK, the USA, Canada, and Australia)
2 Cournot competition: universities compete in terms of quantity: they decide
on the number of students enrolled (as in France, Italy, and Germany, among
others)
The fact that universities pursue both teaching and research objectives
affects how they compete for students:
Students are at once inputs and clients of the educational process (Rotchschild
and White, 1995)
Research requires money; more students enrolled may imply an increased
research budget. However, increasing the size of the student population may
be costly.
M-L. Cabon-Dhersin & J. Didisse How Do Universities Compete for Students? EconomiX, Univ. Paris X, 7 April 2016 9 / 28
Introduction
Introduction
Related literature
Theoretical papers focus on:
1 the performance of universities in terms of costs and returns to higher
education (Garcia-Penalosa and Walde, 2000, Gary-Bobo and Trannoy, 2004,
Kemnitz, 2007),
2 the link between the quality of educational provision, mobility costs and
student choice (De Fraja and Iossa, 2002, Del Rey and Wauthy, 2006),
3 the allocation of academics’ time (Del Rey, 2001, Beath at al, 2003, Gauthier
and Wauthy, 2007, Grazzini et al, 2011),
4 the impact of different funding systems (Beath et al, 2012).
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Our approach:
we assume the existence of capacities in the production of education,
a university can enroll beyond capacity but at a strictly convex cost
(Dastidar, 1995, Chowdhury, 2009, Jacqmin and Wauthy, 2014)
each university’s capacity level is chosen endogenously (Cabon and Drouhin,
2014).
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Results:
Bertrand competition always implies a lower capacity than Cournot
competition.
Universities adopt a high level of fees in Bertrand competition which can rise
with the number of universities.
Cournot competition leads to a higher number of students enrolled in each
university than Bertrand competition.
The equilibrium adopted in Bertrand competition may be more efficient in
terms of cost minimization than in Cournot competition.
An increase in the number of universities has a positive impact on social
welfare, except when the capacity is too high in Cournot competition.
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The model
The model
The utility function
In line with Jacqmin & Wauthy (2014), the objective function of universities
is specified as follows:
Max Ui (T ,R) (1)
with ∂Ui∂T > 0 and
∂Ui
∂R > 0
Students are required for the provision of education: the level of teaching is
equal to the enrollment of students ni weighted according to the parameter
0 < γ < 1:
T = γni
Students provide the funds a university needs to operate either directly
through fees (f ) or indirectly via the government (per-student subsidy s). R
represents each university’s expenditure on research. Here, the research output
Si depends only on the money invested in it:
R = Si
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The model
The cost function
The cost function of each university i is given by
Ci (ni , ki ) =
{
δki if 0 ≤ ni ≤ ki
δki + µ(ni − ki )2 if ni > ki (2)
where µ > 0. Cost parameters (δ and µ) are similar for all universities and
constant.
ni : the number of students enrolled at a university i ,
ki : the capacity of a university i .
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The model
The optimization problem of a university i
The optimization problem of a university i is thus defined as:
Max Ui = γni + Si s.t. Si + Ci (ni , ki ) = ni (fi + s) (3)
There are m identical universities: there is no differentiation in curriculum,
and/or in other non-price dimensions (location, admission standard or
financial endowment...)
Universities are committed to satisfying all the demand they face once the
capacity level is chosen.
We assume that potential students will not differ in their willingness to enroll
and each student gets one unit of education.
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The model
The Cournot competition Model
Sequential game in Cournot competition:
1 First stage: each university i chooses its level of capacity ki taking into
account the threshold capacity of other universities k−i ,
2 Second stage: each university i selects a number of students enrolled ni for a
given level of capacity ki and for a given number of students at other
universities.
Consider the utility of university i in the second stage, conditional on ki :
Ui (ni ;N−i ; ki ) = ni ((1− ni − N−i ) + s + γ)− Ci (ni , ki )
with N−i =
m∑
j=2
j 6=i
nj .
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The model
The Bertrand competition model
Sequential game in Bertrand competition:
1 First stage: universities determine their capacity levels anticipating the effect
on the price equilibria in the second stage of the game.
2 Second stage: universities determine their tuition fees for a given capacity.
The utility function of each university can be rewritten:
Ui (fi , f−i , ki ) =

−δki if fi > f min−i
(fi + γ + s)
N(fi )
m − Ci (N(fi )m , ki ) if fi = f−i
(fi + γ + s)N(fi )− Ci (N(fi ), ki ) if fi < f min−i
with fi , the fee of the university i , and f
min
−i = Min{f1, ..., fi−1, fi+1..., fm}
N(fi ): total number of students enrolled when the university i sets fi
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2 Second stage: universities determine their tuition fees for a given capacity.
The utility function of each university can be rewritten:
Ui (fi , f−i , ki ) =

−δki if fi > f min−i
(fi + γ + s)
N(fi )
m − Ci (N(fi )m , ki ) if fi = f−i
(fi + γ + s)N(fi )− Ci (N(fi ), ki ) if fi < f min−i
with fi , the fee of the university i , and f
min
−i = Min{f1, ..., fi−1, fi+1..., fm}
N(fi ): total number of students enrolled when the university i sets fi
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The model
Equilibria in the Cournot competition model
The symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium values are:
n∗c (m) > k
∗
c (m)
if and only if δ > δ
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The model
Equilibria in the Cournot competition model: comparative
statics
Impact of the number of universities on the equilibrium results:
the capacity k∗c (m) is decreasing with m,
the number of students enrolled at a university n∗c (m) is decreasing with m,
the total number of students enrolled N∗c (m) is increasing with m.
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The model
Equilibria in the Bertrand competition model
Proposition 1
In the second stage, (f1, f2, ..., fm) is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if
f1(k1) = f2(k2) = ... = fm(km) = f
N(ki ), such that
If µ < mm−1 Case 1 If µ =
m
m−1 Case 2 If µ >
m
m−1 Case 3
f N = f¯ (ki ,m) =
µ(m+1)−m(γ+s)−2mµki
m+µm+µ
f N = f˜ (ki ,m) =
(m+1)−(m−1)(γ+s)−2mki
2m
f N = f ∗(ki ,m) =
m(1−γ−s)+2µ(1−mki )
2(m+µ)
M-L. Cabon-Dhersin & J. Didisse How Do Universities Compete for Students? EconomiX, Univ. Paris X, 7 April 2016 20 / 28
The model
Equilibria in the Bertrand competition model
Corollary 2
We verify that: ∀µ, γ, s, δ > 0 and m ≥ 3,
k¯∗b (m) < n¯
∗
b(m)
k˜∗b (m) < n˜
∗
b(m)
k∗b (m) < n
∗
b(m)
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The model
Equilibria in the Bertrand competition model: comparative
statics
Impact of the number of universities on the equilibrium results:
Case 1: µ < mm−1
the capacity k¯b
∗
(m) is decreasing with m,
the level of fees f¯b
∗
(m) is increasing with m,
the total number of students enrolled N¯b
∗
(m) is decreasing with m.
Cases 2 and 3: µ ≥ mm−1
the capacity k∗b (m) is decreasing with m,
the level of fees f¯b
∗
(m) is constant with m,
the total number of students enrolled N∗b (m) is constant with m.
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Comparison of equilibria
Comparison of equilibria: Cournot vs Bertrand
Proposition 3
∀γ, s, δ > 0 and m ≥ 2, we verify that:
The equilibrium level of capacity:
k∗b (m) < k
∗
c (m)
The total number of students enrolled:
1 if µ ≤ µ = 0.4589, N∗c (m) ≤ N¯b∗(m),
2 if µ > µ = 0.4589, N∗c (m) > N
∗
b (m).
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Efficient capacity and social welfare
Efficient capacity and comparison with equilibria
Because of the U-shaped average cost in k , there exists an efficient capacity
which minimizes the average cost:
MinniAC (ki , ni ) = Minni
[
C (ki , ni )
n
]
The capacity which minimizes the average cost for a given number of
students enrolled is:
kmin =
2µni − δ
2µ
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Efficient capacity and social welfare
Efficient capacity and comparison with equilibria
Proposition 4
Comparison between the equilibrium results of the two competition strategies with
the efficient solution:
Cournot equilibrium
vs efficient solution
Bertrand equilibrium vs efficient solution
µ < mm−1 µ ≥ mm−1
capacities kminc < k
∗
c k
min
b > k
∗
b k
min
b = k
∗
b = k˜b
number of students/fees nminc < n
∗
c f
min
b < f
∗
b f
min
b = f
∗
b = f˜b
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Efficient capacity and social welfare
Impact of the number of universities on social welfare
Proposition 5
In the Bertrand competition, social welfare is always increasing with the
number of universities m
Proposition 6
In the Cournot competition, social welfare may decrease with the number of
universities when the capacity is too high:
δ ≤ δ ⇔ n∗c (m) ≤ k∗c (m)
otherwise, social welfare is increasing with m.
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Conclusion
Conclusion
Regarding our results:
Higher tuition in most countries which have adopted a deregulated system
can now be explained by our model,
Cournot competition is likely to induce too high a capacity level in terms of
the minimization of the average cost for the university,
Bertrand competition seems more efficient from this point of view, but only if
the cost is sufficiently convex.
An increase in the number of universities improves social welfare, except in
Cournot competition when the capacity is too high.
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Conclusion
Conclusion
Some limits and possible extensions:
the price elasticity of demand,
the access to financial support or other aid for students,
differentiation in curriculum, and/or other non-price dimensions,
student selection.
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